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Abstract— We analyze the behavior of a large number of
strategic drivers traveling over an urban traffic network using
the mean-field game framework. We assume an incentive
mechanism for congestion mitigation under which each driver
selecting a particular route is charged a tax penalty that is
affine in the logarithm of the number of agents selecting the
same route. We show that the mean-field approximation of such
a large-population dynamic game leads to the so-called linearly
solvable Markov decision process, implying that an open-loop
-Nash equilibrium of the original game can be found simply
by solving a finite-dimensional linear system.
I. INTRODUCTION
A reasonable approach to obtain a macroscopic model of a
road traffic network is to use a game-theoretic analysis (e.g.,
Wardrop [1]) with assumptions that (i) the number of players
involved in the game is large, (ii) each individual player’s
impact on the network is infinitesimal, and (iii) players’
identities are indistinguishable [2]. Dynamic games with
such assumptions are broadly known as mean-field games
(MFG), and have been actively studied in recent years [3],
[4]. The central result in the MFG theory shows that the game
theoretic equilibria (e.g., the Markov perfect equilibria) of
the original large-population game can be well-approximated
by the solution (called mean-field equilibrium, MFE) to
the pair of the backward Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equation and the forward Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK)
equation. This result has a significant impact in applications
where solving the HJB-FPK system is computationally more
tractable than analyzing the equilibria of the original game
with large number of players.
Recently, the MFG theory has been applied to the analysis
of traffic systems. In [5], the authors modeled the interaction
between drivers on a straight road as a non-cooperative
game, and characterized the MFE of this game using an
HJB equation and a mass preservation equation. In [6], the
authors considered a continuous-time Markov chain to model
the aggregate behavior of drivers on a traffic network. They
proposed various routing schemes for balancing the traffic
flow over the network. MFG has been applied to pedestrian
crowd dynamics modeling in [7], [8].
In this paper, we apply the MFG framework to the analysis
of an urban transportation network in which individual
drivers’ dynamics are decoupled from each other, but their
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cost functions are coupled via the tax penalty/reward mecha-
nism imposed by the Traffic System Operator (TSO). In our
context, the tax mechanism provides drivers with incentives
to route themselves in such a way that their collective
behavior matches the desirable traffic flow pre-calculated by
the TSO. In particular, we are interested in the log-population
type of the tax mechanisms (i.e., the penalty imposed on an
individual driver is affine in the logarithm of the number
of drivers taking the same route). Such a tax mechanism
is notable, as it renders the mean-field approximation of
the original large-population game linearly solvable using
the result of [9]. This offers a tremendous computational
advantage over the conventional HJB-FPK characterization
of the MFE. The purpose of this paper is to delineate this
observation and to demonstrate its computational advantages
using a numerical simulation.
A. Mean-field game theory: Background
The MFG theory has been introduced by the authors
of [3], [4] and has been applied to the analysis of large-
population games appearing in engineering, economic and
financial applications. The central subject in the MFG theory
is the coupled HJB-FPK system, which has attracted much
attention in mathematical and engineering research [4], [10].
The MFE of linear quadratic stochastic games have been
extensively studied in the literature, e.g., [11], [12], [13]
and references therein. MFGs with non-linear cost function
and/or non-linear dynamics are also studied in, e.g., [5], [14].
The MFE of a Markov decision game with a major agent
and a large number of minor agents was studied in [14],
where the players are only coupled via their cost functions.
These results were used in [15] to design decentralized
security defense decisions in a mobile ad hoc network. The
authors of [16] studied the MFE of a dynamic stochastic
game wherein the dynamic of each agent is described by
a (non-linear) stochastic difference equation, and agents are
coupled via both dynamics and cost functions. The authors
in [17] considered a stochastic dynamic game in which the
dynamics and cost function of each agent is affected by its
individual disturbance term. They studied the existence of
a robust (minimax) MFE. In [18], the authors analyzed the
MFE of a hybrid stochastic game in which the dynamics
of agents are affected by continuous disturbance terms as
well as random switching signals. Risk-sensitive MFG was
considered in [19]. While continuous-time continuous-state
models are commonly used in the references above, the
MFG in discrete-time and/or discrete-state regime have been
considered in, e.g., [20]–[22].
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B. Contribution of this paper
In this paper, we apply the MFG theory to study the strate-
gic behavior of infinitesimal drivers traveling over an urban
traffic network. We consider a dynamic stochastic game
wherein, at each intersection, each driver randomly selects
one of the outgoing links as her next destination according to
her randomized policy. The objective function of each driver
consists of the cost of taking different links at different time-
steps as well as a tax penalty/incentive term computed by the
TSO. At a given time, the tax associated with a particular
link depends on the log-population of drivers traveling on
that link. Our problem set up is motivated by the mechanism
design problem in which the TSO’s objective is to keep the
empirical distribution of agents over the links at each time
as close as possible to a target distribution.
As the main technical contribution of this paper, we prove
that the MFE of the game described above is given by the
solution to a linearly solvable MDP. We emphasize that
the MFE in our setting can be computed by performing a
sequence of matrix multiplications backward in time only
once, without any need of forward-in-time computations.
This is a stark contrast to the standard MFG results where
there is a need to solve a forward-backward HJB-FPK
system, which is often a non-trivial task [10]. To highlight
this computational advantage, we restrict ourselves to the
discrete-time, discrete-space setting. Our result is different
from [22] although the entropy-like cost considered there
is similar to the Kullback-Leibler cost that appears in our
analysis. The game considered in [22] involves only a fixed
number of players (which can be thought of as routing
policies at intersections rather than infinitesimal drivers) and
no mean-field limit is considered.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Let the directed graph G = (V, E) (referred to as the
traffic graph) represent the topology of the underlying traffic
network, where V = {1, 2, ..., V } is the set of nodes
(intersections) and E = {1, 2, ..., E} is the set of directed
edges (links). For each i ∈ V , denote by V(i) ⊆ V the
set of intersections to which there is a directed link from
the intersection i. Let N = {1, 2, ..., N} be the set of
players (drivers) on the graph G. At any given time step
t ∈ T = {0, 1, ..., T − 1}, each player is located at an
intersection. The node at which the n-th player is located
at time step t is denoted by in,t ∈ V . At every time step,
player n selects an action jn,t ∈ V(in,t), which represents
her next destination. By selecting jn,t at time t, the player
n moves to the node jn,t at time t+1 deterministically (i.e.,
in,t+1 = jn,t). Let P0 = {P i0}i∈V be a probability mass
function over V . At t = 0, we assume in,0 for each n ∈ N
is realized independently with probability distribution P0.
A. Players’ strategies
Each player traverses on G according to her individual
randomized policy. More precisely, for each n ∈ N , i ∈ V
and t ∈ T , let Qin,t = {Qijn,t}j∈V(i) be the decision policy
of player n at the intersection i at time t, representing a
probability distribution according to which she selects the
next destination j ∈ V(i). We consider the collection Qn,t =
{Qin,t}i∈V of such probability distributions as the strategy of
player n at time t. Namely, for each n ∈ N and t ∈ T , we
have Qn,t ∈ Q, where
Q =
{
{Qij}i∈V,j∈V(i) : Q
ij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ V, j ∈ V(i)∑
j∈V(i)Q
ij = 1 ∀i ∈ V
}
is the space of strategies. As clarified below, in this paper
we consider a game with the open-loop information pattern
[23].
If the strategy {Qn,t}t∈T of player n is fixed, then the
probability distribution Pn,t = {P in,t}i∈V of her location at
time t is recursively computed by
P jn,t+1 =
∑
i
P in,tQ
ij
n,t ∀t ∈ T , j ∈ V (1)
with the initial condition Pn,0 = P0. If (in,t, jn,t) is the
location-action pair of player n at time t, it has a joint
distribution P in,tQ
ij
n,t, and it is statistically independent of
(im,t, jm,t) with m 6= n.
B. Action costs
For each i ∈ V , j ∈ V(i) and t ∈ T , let Cijt be a given
constant that represents the cost (e.g., fuel cost) incurred to
each agent who takes action j at location i at time t. We will
also introduce the terminal cost CiT , i ∈ V for each player
arriving at state i at the final time step t = T .
C. Tax mechanisms and incentives
We assume that players are also subject to individual and
time-varying tax penalties calculated by the TSO. Individual
tax values depend not only on the players’ locations and
actions, but also on how the entire population is distributed
over the traffic graph G. Specifically, we consider the follow-
ing log-population tax mechanism, where the tax charged to
player n taking action j at location i at time t is
piijN,t,n = α
(
log
KijN,t
KiN,t
− logRijt
)
. (2)
In (2), α > 0 is a fixed constant. The parameter Rijt > 0 is
also a fixed constant satisfying
∑
j R
ij
t = 1 for each i. R
ij
t
can be interpreted as the reference policy (state transition
probability) designated by the TSO in advance. KiN,t is the
number of agents (including player n) who are located at the
intersection i at time t, and KijN,t is the number of agents
(including player n) who takes the action j at the intersection
i at time t. The tax rule (2) indicates that agent n receives
a positive payment by taking action j at location i at time
t if KijN,t/K
i
N,t < R
ij
t , while she is penalized by doing
so if KijN,t/K
i
N,t > R
ij
t . Since K
i
N,t and K
ij
N,t are random
variables, piijN,t,n is also a random variable. We assume that
the TSO is able to observe KiN,t and K
ij
N,t at every time step
and hence piijN,t,n is computable.
1
1Whenever piijN,t,n is computed, we have both K
ij
N,t ≥ 1 and KiN,t ≥ 1
since at least player n herself is counted. Hence (2) is well-defined.
Since player n’s probability of taking action j at location
i at time step t is given by P in,tQ
ij
n,t, the total number K
ij
N,t
of such players follows the Poisson binomial distribution
Pr(KijN,t = k) =
∑
A∈Fk
∏
n∈A
P in,tQ
ij
n,t
∏
nc∈Ac
(1− P inc,tQijnc,t).
Here, Fk is the set of all subsets of size k that can be selected
from N = {1, 2, ..., N}, and Ac = Fk\A. Similarly, the
distribution of KiN,t is given by
Pr(KiN,t = k) =
∑
A∈Fk
∏
n∈A
P in,t
∏
nc∈Ac
(1− P inc,t).
Notice also that the conditional probability distribution of
KijN,t given player n’s location-action pair (in,t, jn,t) = (i, j)
is
Pr(KijN,t = k + 1 | in,t = i, jn,t = j)
=
∑
A∈F−nk
∏
m∈A
P im,tQ
ij
m,t
∏
mc∈A−c
(1− P imc,tQijmc,t). (3)
Here, F−nk is the set of all subsets of size k that can be
selected from N\{n}, and A−c = F−nk \A. Similarly, the
conditional probability distribution of KiN,t given in,t = i is
Pr(KiN,t = k + 1 | in,t = i)
=
∑
A∈F−nk
∏
m∈A
P im,t
∏
mc∈A−c
(1− P imc,t). (4)
Therefore, given the prior knowledge that the player n’s
location-action pair at time t is (i, j), the expectation of her
tax penalty piijN,n,t is
ΠijN,n,t , E
[
piijN,n,t | in,t = i, jn,t = j
]
=
N−1∑
k=0
α log
k + 1
N
∑
A∈F−nk
∏
m∈A
P im,tQ
ij
m,t
∏
mc∈Ac
(1−P imc,tQijmc,t)
−
N−1∑
k=0
α log
k + 1
N
∑
A∈F−nk
∏
m∈A
P im,t
∏
mc∈Ac
(1−P imc,t)
− α logRijt . (5)
Notice that the quantity (5) depends on the strategies Q−n ,
{Qm}m 6=n, but not on Qn. In other words, piijN,n,t is a
random variable whose distribution does not depend on
player n’s own strategy. This fact will be used in Section IV.
D. Road traffic game
The N -player dynamic game considered in this paper is
now formulated as follows.
1) State dynamics: We consider the probability distribu-
tion Pn,t as the state of player n at time t, and Qn,t as her
control input. Each individual’s state dynamics is governed
by (1). Notice that different players’ dynamics are decoupled.
2) Cost functionals: The n-th player’s cost functional is
given by
J ({Qn,t}t∈T , {Q−n,t}t∈T )
=
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i,j
P in,tQ
ij
n,t
(
Cijt + Π
ij
N,n,t
)
+
∑
i
P in,TC
i
T .
Notice that this quantity depends not only on the n-th
player’s own strategy {Qn,t}t∈T but also on the other
players’ strategies {Q−n,t}t∈T through the term ΠijN,n,t,
whose precise expression is given by (5).
3) Information pattern: Throughout this paper, we restrict
our analysis to the open-loop information pattern [23]. More
precisely, each player n must fix a sequence of strategies
{Qn,t}t∈T in advance based only on the public knowledge
G, α,N , T , Rijt , Cijt , CiT and P0. Players are not allowed to
update their strategies in real-time based on the observations
{KijN,t}t∈T .2
4) Solution concept: We introduce the following equilib-
rium concepts for the game described above.
Definition 1: The N -tuple of strategies {QNEn,t}n∈N ,t∈T
is said to be an (open-loop) Nash equilibrium if the following
inequality holds for each n ∈ N and {Qn,t}t∈T , Qn,t ∈ Q:
J
({Qn,t}t∈T , {QNE−n,t}t∈T ) ≥ J ({QNEn,t}t∈T , {QNE−n,t}t∈T ) .
Definition 2: A Nash equilibrium {QNEn,t}n∈N ,t∈T is said
to be symmetric if
{QNE1,t}t∈T = {QNE2,t}t∈T = · · · = {QNEN,t}t∈T .
Remark 1: The N -player game described above is a
symmetric game in the sense of [24]. Thus, [24, Theorem 3]
is applicable to show that it has a symmetric equilibrium.
Definition 3: A set of strategies {QMFEn,t }n∈N ,t∈T is said
to be an MFE if the following conditions are satisfied.
(a) It is symmetric, i.e.,
{QMFE1,t }t∈T = {QMFE2,t }t∈T = · · · = {QMFEN,t }t∈T .
(b) There exists a sequence {N} satisfying N ↘ 0 as
N →∞ such that for each n ∈ N = {1, 2, ..., N} and
for each {Qn,t}t∈T with Qn,t ∈ Q,
J
({Qn,t}t∈T , {QMFE−n,t}t∈T )+ N
≥ J ({QMFEn,t }t∈T , {QMFE−n,t}t∈T ) .
III. LINEARLY SOLVABLE MDPS
In this section, we introduce an auxiliary optimal control
problem that is closely related to the road traffic game
introduced in the previous section. The result in this section
will serve as a tool to find an MFE in the road traffic game
described above. The main emphasis in this section is that the
introduced auxiliary optimal control problem belongs to the
class of linearly-solvable MDPs [9], [25]. This fact provides
2In the future, we will consider a closed-loop implementation in which the
open-loop optimization is performed repeatedly over the receding horizon.
a tremendous advantage in the computation of mean-field
equilibria in the road traffic game.
For each t = 0, ..., T , let Pt be the probability distribution
over the vertices V that evolves according to
P jt+1 =
∑
i
P itQ
ij
t ∀j ∈ V
with the initial state P0. We consider Pt as the state of the
dynamics and Qt as the control action in the optimal control
problem below. We assume Cijt , R
ij
t for each t ∈ T , i ∈
I, j ∈ I, CiT for i ∈ I, and α are given positive constants.
The T -step optimal control problem of our interest is:
min
{Qt}t∈T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i,j
P itQ
ij
t
(
Cijt + α log
Qijt
Rijt
)
+
∑
i
P iTC
i
T .
(6)
Notice that the logarithmic term in (6) can be written as the
Kullback–Leibler divergence from the reference policy Rijt
to the selected policy Qijt . For each t = 0, 1, ..., T , introduce
the value function:
Vt(Pt) ,
min
{Qτ}T−1τ=t
T−1∑
τ=t
∑
i,j
P iτQ
ij
τ
(
Cijτ + α log
Qijτ
Rijτ
)
+
∑
i
P iTC
i
T
and the associated Bellman equation
Vt(Pt) =
min
Qt
∑
i,j
P iτQ
ij
τ
(
Cijτ + α log
Qijτ
Rijτ
)
+Vt+1(Pt+1)
 . (7)
The next theorem states that the optimal control problem (6)
is linearly solvable [9].
Theorem 1: Let {φt}t∈T be the sequence of V -
dimensional vectors defined by the backward recursion
φit =
∑
j
Rijt exp
(
−C
ij
t
α
)
φjt+1 ∀i ∈ V = {1, 2, ..., V }
(8)
with the terminal condition φiT = exp(−CiT /α) ∀i. Then,
for each t ∈ T and Pt, the value function can be written as
Vt(Pt) = −α
∑
i
P it log φ
i
t. (9)
Moreover, the optimal policy for (6) is given by
Qij∗t =
φjt+1
φit
Rijt exp
(
−C
ij
t
α
)
. (10)
Proof: Due to the choice of the terminal condition
φiT = exp(−CiT /α), notice that
VT (PT ) =
∑
i
P iTC
i
T = −α
∑
i
P iT log φ
i
T .
Thus, (9) holds for t = T . To complete the proof by
backward induction, assume that
Vt+1(Pt+1) = −α
∑
i
P it+1 log φ
i
t+1
holds for some 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. Then, due to the Bellman
equation (7), we have
Vt(Pt) = min
Qt
∑
i,j
P iτQ
ij
τ
(
ρijτ + α log
Qijτ
Rijτ
)
where ρijt = C
ij
t −α log φjt+1 is a constant. It is elementary
to show that the minimum is attained by
Qij∗t =
Rijt
φt
exp
(
−ρ
ij
t
α
)
from which (10) follows. By substitution, the optimal value
is shown to be
Vt(Pt) = −α
∑
i
P it log φ
i
t.
This completes the induction proof.
We stress that (8) is linear in φ and can be computed by
matrix multiplications backward in time.
IV. MEAN FIELD EQUILIBRIUM
Let {Q∗t }t∈T be the control policy obtained in (10), and
let {P ∗t }t∈T be defined recursively by
P j∗t+1 =
∑
i
P i∗t Q
ij∗
t ∀j ∈ V.
In this section, we consider the situation in which all players
other than n adopt the strategy {Q∗t }t∈T , and then analyze
player n’s best response. For each t ∈ T , the probability
that the m-th player (m 6= n) is located at i is P i∗t .
As before, define ΠijN,n,t as the expected value of the tax
penalty charged on player n at time t when she takes
action j at location i. Since players’ dynamics over the
traffic graph are decoupled, and ΠijN,n,t is computed by the
population excluding player n, ΠijN,n,t does not depend on
player n’s strategy. Therefore, the best response by player
n is characterized by the solution to the following optimal
control problem:
min
{Qn,t}t∈T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i,j
P in,tQ
ij
n,t
(
Cijt + Π
ij
N,n,t
)
+
∑
i
P in,TC
i
T ,
(11)
where ΠijN,n,t can be considered as a fixed constant. To
evaluate ΠijN,n,t when all players other than player n takes
the same strategy (i.e., Qm,t = Q∗t for m 6= n), notice
that the conditional distributions of KijN,t and K
i
N,t given
(in,t, jn,t) = (i, j), provided by (3) and (4), simplify to the
binomial distributions
Pr(KijN,t = k + 1|in,t = i, jn,t = j)
=
(
N−1
k
)
(P i∗t Q
ij∗
t )
k(1− P i∗t Qij∗t )N−1−k
Pr(KiN,t = k + 1|in,t = i)
=
(
N−1
k
)
(P i∗t )
k(1− P i∗t )N−1−k.
Thus, the expression (5) simplifies to
ΠijN,n,t = E
[
piijN,n,t | in = i, jn = j
]
=
N−1∑
k=0
α log
k + 1
N
(
N−1
k
)
(P i∗t Q
ij∗
t )
k(1−P i∗t Qij∗t )N−1−k
−
N−1∑
k=0
α log
k + 1
N
(
N−1
k
)
(P i∗t )
k(1−P i∗t )N−1−k
− α logRijt (12)
A. Optimal solution to (11) when N →∞
Next, we study the asymptotic limit of ΠijN,n,t as N →∞.
Lemma 1: Let ΠijN,n,t be defined by (12). If P
i∗
t Q
ij∗
t >
0, then
lim
N→∞
ΠijN,n,t = α log
Qij∗t
Rijt
.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Lemma 1 implies that in the limit N → ∞, the optimal
control problem (11) becomes
min
{Qn,t}t∈T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i,j
P in,tQ
ij
n,t
(
Cijt +α log
Qij∗t
Rijt
)
+
∑
i
P in,TC
i
T .
(13)
Notice that (13) is different from the auxiliary optimal con-
trol problem (6) studied in Section III in that the logarithmic
term in (13) is a fixed constant that does not depend on
the control policy. Nevertheless, these two optimal control
problems are closely related as we show below. To solve
(13), we once again apply dynamic programming. For each
Pn,t, define the value function
Vn,t(Pn,t) ,
min
{Qn,τ}Tτ=t
T−1∑
τ=t
∑
i,j
P in,τQ
ij
n,τ
(
Cijτ +α log
Qij∗τ
Rijτ
)
+
∑
i
P in,TC
i
T
The value function satisfies the Bellman equation:
Vn,t(Pn,t) =
min
Qn,t
∑
i,j
P in,tQ
ij
n,t
(
Cijt +α log
Qij∗t
Rijt
)
+Vn,t+1(Pn,t+1)
 .
(14)
The next key lemma shows that Vn,t(·) coincide with the
value function Vt(·) for (6). It also shows an interesting
property of the optimal control problem (13) that any feasible
control policy is an optimal control policy.
Lemma 2: Let {φt}t∈T be the sequence defined by (8).
(a) For each t ∈ T and Pn,t, we have
Vn,t(Pn,t) = −α
∑
i
P in,t log φ
i
t.
(b) An arbitrary sequence of control actions {Qn,t}t∈T
with Qn,t ∈ Q is an optimal solution to (13).
Proof: (a). Proof is by backward induction. If t = T ,
the claim trivially holds due to the definition Vn,T (PT ) =∑
i P
i
n,TC
i
T and the fact that the terminal condition for (8)
is given by φiT = exp(−CiT /α). Thus, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1,
assume that
Vn,t+1(Pn,t+1) = −α
∑
j
P jn,t+1 log φ
j
t+1
holds. Using ρijt = C
ij
t − α log φjt+1, the Bellman equation
(14) can be written as
Vn,t(Pn,t) = min
Qn,t
∑
i,j
P in,tQ
ij
n,t
(
ρijt + α log
Qij∗t
Rijt
)
. (15)
Substituting Qij∗t obtained by (10) into (15), we have
Vn,t(Pn,t) = min
Qn,t
∑
i,j
P in,tQ
ij
n,t
(−α log φit)
= min
Qn,t
∑
i
P in,t
(−α log φit)∑
j
Qijn,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
(16a)
= −α
∑
i
P in,t log φ
i
t. (16b)
This completes the proof.
(b). Since the final expression (16b) does not depend on
Qn,t, any control action Qn,t ∈ Q is a minimizer of the right
hand side of the Bellman equation (14).
Lemma 2 (b) shows that an arbitrary policy is optimal in
the optimal control problem (13). This result is a reminiscent
of the Wardrop’s principle [1] (see also [26] and references
therein), which states that travel costs are equal on all used
routes at the game-theoretic equilibrium among strategic and
infinitesimal travelers.
B. Mean field equilibrium
We are now ready to state the main result of this paper.
The next theorem, together with Theorem 1, provides a
numerical method to compute an MFE of the road traffic
game presented in Section II.
Theorem 2: A symmetric strategy profile Qijn,t = Q
ij∗
t
for each n ∈ N , t ∈ T and i, j ∈ V , where Qij∗t is obtained
by (8)–(10), is an MFE of the road traffic game.
Proof: Let the policies Qijm,t = Q
ij∗
t for m 6= n be
fixed. It is sufficient to show that there exists a sequence
N ↘ 0 such that the cost of adopting a strategy Qijn,t = Qij∗t
for player n is no greater than N plus the cost of adopting
any other policy. Since
ΠijN,n,t → α log
Qij∗t
Rijt
as N →∞,
there exists a sequence δN ↘ 0 such that
ΠijN,n,t + δN > α log
Qij∗t
Rijt
∀i, j, t.
Now, for all policy {Qn,t}t∈T of player n and the induced
distributions P jn,t =
∑
i P
i
n,tQ
ij
n,t, we have
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i,j
P in,tQ
ij
n,t
(
Cijt + Π
ij
N,n,t
)
>
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i,j
P in,tQ
ij
n,t
(
Cijt + α log
Qij∗t
Rijt
− δN
)
=
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i,j
P in,tQ
ij
n,t
(
Cijt + α log
Qij∗t
Rijt
)
− TV 2δN
≥ min
{Qn,t}t∈T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i,j
P in,tQ
ij
n,t
(
Cijt + α log
Qij∗t
Rijt
)
− TV 2δN .
Notice that the minimization in the last line is attained by
adopting Qijn,t = Q
ij∗
t . Since N , TV 2δN ↘ 0, this
completes the proof.
V. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION
In this section, we illustrate the result of Theorem 2
applied to a simple mean-field road traffic game over a traffic
graph with 100 nodes (a grid world with obstacles) shown
in Fig. 1 and over time horizon T = 70. At t = 0, the
population is concentrated in the origin cell (indicated by
“O”). For each player n, the terminal cost is given by CiT =
10
√
dist(i,D), where dist(i,D) is the Manhattan distance
between the player’s final location i and the destination cell
(indicated by “D”). For each time step t, the action cost for
each player is given by
Cijt =

0 if j = i
1 if j ∈ V(i)
100000 if j 6∈ V(i) or j is an obstacle.
where V(i) contains the north, east, south, and west neigh-
borhood of the cell #i. As the reference distribution, we use
Rijt = 1/|V(i)| (uniform distribution) for each i ∈ V and
t ∈ T to incentivize players to spread over the traffic graph.
For various values of α > 0, the backward formula (8)
is solved and the optimal policy is calculated by (10). If α
is small (e.g., α = 0.1), it is expected that players will take
the shortest path since the action cost is dominant compared
to the tax cost (2). Numerical results confirm this intuition;
three figures in the top row of Fig. 1 show snapshots of
the population distribution at time steps t = 20, 35 and 50,
assuming all the players take the MFE policy obtained by
(10). In the bottom row, similar plots are generated with
a larger α (α = 1). In this case, it can be seen that the
equilibrium strategy will choose longer paths with higher
probability to reduce congestion.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we showed that the mean-field approxima-
tion of a large-population road traffic game under the log-
population tax mechanism can be obtained by the linearly
Fig. 1. Simulation results for road traffic game at t = 20, 35, 50 and for
α = 0.1 and 1.
solvable MDP. This result will serve as the basis for further
research in the future. For instance, the close-loop imple-
mentation of the considered game (similar to the receding
horizon implementation of model predictive control) and
the corresponding feedback Nash equilibria are worthwhile
to study. How the obtained results in this paper can be
used in the mechanism design problems should also be
investigated in the future. For instance, in this paper we have
not discussed how the reference policy Rijt should be chosen
by the TSO.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Let KiN,−n,t denote the number of agents, except agent n,
which are located at intersection i at time t and let KijN,−n,t
denote the number of agents, except agent n, which are
located at intersection i at time t and select intersection
j as their next destination. Thus, we have KiN,−n,t =∑
l 6=n 1{il,t = i} and KijN,−n,t =
∑
l 6=n 1{il,t = i, jl,t = j},
where 1{·} is the indicator function. Then, Πij∗N,n,t can be
written as
Πij∗N,n,t =E
[
log
1+KijN,−n,t
1+KiN,−n,t
]
− logRijt
=E
[
log
(
1+KijN,−n,t
N
)]
−
E
[
log
(
1+KiN,−n,t
N
)]
− logRijt
Using Jensen inequality, we have
E
[
log
(
1+KijN,−n,t
N
)]
≤ log
(
1
N
+ E
[
KijN,−n,t
N
])
(a)
= log
(
1
N
+
N − 1
N
P i∗t Q
ij∗
t
)
where (a) follows from E
[
KijN,−n,t
N
]
= N−1N P
i∗
t Q
ij∗
t and
the fact that all the agents employ the policy {Q∗t }. Thus,
we have
lim sup
N→∞
E
[
log
1+KijN,−n,t
N
]
≤ logP i∗t Qij∗t (17)
Next we show the other direction. For  ∈ (0, P i∗t Qij∗t2
]
, we
can write E
[
log
1+KijN,−n,t
N
]
as
E
[
log
1+KijN,−n,t
N
]
=E
[
log
1+KijN,−n,t
N 1
{
KijN,−n,t
N > 
}]
+
E
[
log
1+KijN,−n,t
N 1
{
KijN,−n,t
N ≤ 
}]
Using the Hoeffding inequality, it follows that
KijN,−n,t
N
converges to P i∗t Q
ij∗
t in probability as N becomes large.
From continues mapping theorem, we have the conver-
gence of log
KijN,−n,t
N in probability to logP
i∗
t Q
ij∗
t for
P i∗t Q
ij∗
t > 0. Similarly, 1
{
KijN,−n,t
N > 
}
converges
to 1 in probability. Thus, from Slutsky’s Theorem, we
have log
1+KijN,−n,t
N 1
{
KijN,−n,t
N > 
}
converges to P i∗t Q
ij∗
t
in distribution. Using Fatou’s lemma and the fact that
log
1+KijN,−n,t
N 1
{
KijN,−n,t
N > 
}
≥ log  , we have
lim inf
N→∞
E
[
log
1+KijN,−n,t
N 1
{
KijN,−n,t
N > 
}]
≥ logP i∗t Qij∗t
We also have∣∣∣∣E [log 1+KijN,−n,tN 1{KijN,−n,tN ≤ }]∣∣∣∣
≤ log (N)Pr
(
KijN,−n,t
N ≤ 
)
Using the Hoeffding inequality, it is straightforward to show
that Pr
(
KijN,−n,t
N ≤ 
)
decays to zero exponentially in N
which implies that
lim
N→∞
E
[
log
1+KijN,−n,t
N 1
{
KijN,−n,t
N ≤ 
}]
= 0
Thus, we have
lim inf
N→∞
E
[
log
1+KijN,−n,t
N
]
≥ logP i∗t Qij∗t (18)
which implies that limN→∞ E
[
log
(
1+KijN,−n,t
N
)]
=
logP i∗t Q
ij∗
t . Following similar steps, it is straightforward to
show that limN→∞ E
[
log
(
1+KiN,−n,t
N
)]
= logP i∗t which
completes the proof.
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